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This paper explores the properties that cross-national activities need to have in order to shape the attitudes of state officials in non-democratic countries toward democratic governance. By looking at bureaucrats, a group of actors is selected that plays a crucial role in sustaining authoritarian rule or eventually implementing democratic change from within the state apparatus. The results of cross-sectional, multivariate regression analyses based on original survey data covering the attitudes of Moroccan officials emphasize that linkage needs to provide the opportunity to practice in order to socialize into democratic governance in authoritarian contexts, a condition fulfilled by cooperative exchange within transgovernmental networks, but not by more diffuse types of transnational linkage such as international education and foreign media broadcasting. The study offers central insights into the micro-mechanisms underlying democratic diffusion.

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Transnational interchange is widely expected to form channels of ideological diffusion, changing the attitudes if not the behavior of domestic actors turning them into democratically-minded agents within predominantly non-democratic environments (Levitsky and Way 2005; Simmons, Dobbin *et al.* 2006). Existing studies of democratic diffusion statistically demonstrate that the strength of transnational ties to democracies is systematically correlated with democracy (Kopstein and Reilly 2000; Starr and Lindborg 2003; Doorenspleet 2004; Wejnert 2005; Gleditsch and Ward 2006). However, as they use comprehensive predictors such as geographic proximity, which are only proxies for an assortment of transnational interchanges, these macro-level studies neglect to explicitly test the theoretical micro-foundation of their argument. The few existing micro-level studies appear to present a diverse picture in terms of the effect produced. Since each is limited to one specific type of influence, most prominently foreign media use (e.g., Kern and Hainmueller 2009), migration to Western democracies (e.g., Pérez-Armendáriz and Crow 2010), or international education (e.g., Atkinson 2010), they cannot provide illumination as to which types of transnational influence actually yield democratic socialization. Hence, despite the growing body of research on democratic diffusion through transnational linkages, we know little about whether and under what conditions cross-national activities socialize individuals in authoritarian contexts into democratic principles and practices. Motivated by this puzzle, this paper aims to advance our understanding of the effects of transnational linkages at the micro-level of individuals' attitudes. I show that exposure to democratic governance needs to be structured, targeted and interpersonal in order to result in democratic socialization. In particular, only if linkage implied direct contact and provided the opportunity to practice it successfully socialized individuals from non-democratic regimes into democratic governance.

The argument is empirically scrutinized by exploiting an original data set on attitudes toward democratic governance that I created on the basis of a survey I conducted among 150 Moroccan state officials.¹ In addition, interviews and answers to open survey questions

demonstrate the plausibility of the argument. By looking at bureaucrats rather than the political elite or citizens, a group of actors is selected which plays a crucial role in sustaining authoritarian rule or eventually implementing democratic change from within the regime (Baker 2002: 5). As “government in action”, state officials formulate and implement policy. Externally driven changes in understandings of appropriate governance among the administrative staff can thus directly shape national-level policies (Farazmand, 2010). The focus is on Morocco, which serves the study’s purpose in two ways. On the one hand, in 2008, at the time of this study, this “liberalized autocracy” (Brumberg 2002) has one of the world’s most durable but politically most liberalized authoritarian regimes. It thus presents a country case that allows a separation of external influences from domestic dynamics as attitude change toward democratic principles is unlikely to happen in the absence of influences from the outside. On the other hand, Morocco has developed strong ties with Western democracies through various linkages between economies, politics and societies. Hence, if transnational influences shape state officials’ understandings of appropriate governance in authoritarian regimes, then such an effect should occur in the present case. Correspondingly, if we find no empirical support, we cannot expect that transnational interchange yields a significant democratizing effect in cases where it is less dense and the degree of political liberalization is lower.

This paper contributes to the development of micro-foundations for comparative research on democratic diffusion. By comparing the micro-effects of three very different forms of transnational interchange – international education, foreign media, and transgovernmental networks –, I am able to identify the properties that linkages between democratic and non-democratic countries need in order to unfold the potential for democratic socialization. Drawing on the “contact hypothesis” in social psychology (Allport 1954), I theorize that exposure is more likely to shape individuals’ attitudes the more their experiences take place in a targeted, structured and interpersonal setting. Specifically, I expect that

participation in transgovernmental networks will have a stronger impact on the attitudes toward democratic governance of the Moroccan state officials involved than having studied in an established democracy or using foreign media. Transgovernmental networks offer possibilities to experience democratic governance in a clear and less abstract manner, to discuss potential ambiguities, and to practice them in day-to-day administrative routines. While the study of the effects of transnational linkage on attitudes has a long tradition, the presented research on transgovernmental networks as site of democratic socialization opens up a new field in the area of democratic diffusion and international socialization.

In the next section of the paper I develop the theoretical framework that embeds linkage approaches to transnational influences in the literature on international socialization. I then specify the research design. The paper proceeds to test the hypotheses on the relationship between exposure to transnational linkages and attitude toward democratic governance against evidence from original survey data and interviews. I finish the paper with a comprehensive discussion about the results.

Transnational Influences and Democratic Socialization

My theoretical starting point is the constructivist work on socialization in International Relations in which international institutions are seen as constituting a “site of socialization” (Checkel 2005; cf. Johnston 2001). I adopt the idea that actors embedded in international institutions can become acquainted with community-shared norms as a consequence of social interaction and apply it to the transfer of democratic governance in the transnational realm. I thereby bridge two strands of literature in International Relations that have hitherto remained somewhat distinct, namely the literature on international socialization on the one hand, and that on democratic diffusion on the other. Considering that both democratic diffusion and international socialization are ultimately built on the assumption that exposure to transnational norms shapes the attitudes of domestic actors toward these norms, the bridge is

built by bringing the democratic socialization of domestic actors as a consequence of exposure to democratic practices and principles via transnational linkages to the core of the analysis.

With regard to transnational linkages, I provide a differentiated analysis of democratic diffusion via different kinds of people-to-people contact and examine both the independent and interaction effects contact might have on individuals' attitudes. Building upon literature that emphasizes the democratizing potential of transnational exchange, I explore the effect of conventionally analyzed linkages – international education and foreign media – and adjoin a widely disregarded type, transgovernmental networks. This comparative approach is based on the reasoning that, first, not all transnational linkages are the same but present different types of exposure, and, second, different types of transnational linkage might exert influence at the same time and interfere with each other.

I adopt an approach to international socialization that differs from existing research in three regards. First, I develop a perspective that cuts across the two predominant strands of research on international socialization – socialization through and socialization in international institutions – and unites the more promising aspects. Second, I apply a definition of socialization as attitude change that is anchored in social psychology and departs from a narrow understanding of internalization. Third, I select an empirical case that allows me to confidently measure international rather than national socialization. I propose that these three conceptual modifications enable me to capture socialization effects that have hitherto been disregarded, as will subsequently be outlined.

First, research on international socialization can be classified into two predominant strands. The first strand analyzes the transfer of transnational norms but considers socialization as the outcome of direct promotional efforts of external actors at the level of the state (government) (Finnemore 1993; Risse, Ropps *et al.* 1999; Flockhart 2004). The second strand views international institutions as sites of socialization but is predominantly interested

in identity transformation on the part of individuals delegated to international organizations (Kerr 1973; Checkel 2005; Hooghe 2005). My research integrates both branches as it views transnational influences as creating a site of socialization but concentrates on changes in attitudes toward democratic governance. In contrast to earlier research on international micro-socialization, in the present study democratic socialization implies no changes of loyalty or identity touching upon the core of an individual's personality. Instead, it refers to transnational rules and practices that belong to the professional realm of state officials and are introduced as side-effects of transnational interchange rather than by straightforward promotion strategies, which, I assume, facilitate socialization.

Second, I define democratic socialization as being present to the degree that individuals change their attitudes toward democratic governance through exposure to transnational influences. This definition largely corresponds to the sociologist understanding of socialization as “social process through which agent properties and preferences change as a result of interaction” (Checkel and Moravcsik 2001: 220). Yet, by referring to socialization as the outcome rather than the process of socializing or both, my understanding departs from this classical one. In addition, I distance myself from the ambitious target of measuring “internalization” or “full socialization”, which “implies that agents adopt the interests, or even possibly the identity, of the [socializing] community” (Checkel 2005: 804) and ascribe them a “‘taken-for-granted’-quality” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 904). Instead, I draw on social psychology and apply a two-dimensional understanding of attitude change that regards attitudes as encompassing affective (i.e. emotion-based) and cognitive (i.e. belief-based) components (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991: 31; Eagly and Chaiken 1993). In this perspective, attitude change refers not only to affective change like increased agreement and support, where actors internalize democratic modes of governance as appropriate in specific situations. It also covers influences at the level of cognition: actors acquire knowledge about democratic governance leading to a change in their ‘factual beliefs’ that is their knowledge about the

meaning, prerequisites, performance and other attributes of democratic governance. Although it is important to analytically distinguish between affective and cognitive components, a difference in mechanisms (internalization vs. learning) and outcomes (affective vs. cognitive changes in attitude) is not discernible in this study. Since norms of democratic governance are rather abstract and are unlikely to be supported (and reported) without being understood, I assume that, first, affective attitude change presumes prior cognitive processes, and, second that individuals' attitudes toward democratic governance can to a large extent be summarized as one-dimensional. This corresponds to earlier research that conceptualized socialization as "both cognitive learning and at least minimal internalization of appropriate norms" (Moore 1969: 868). The presented study thus captures subliminal effects of external influences in authoritarian contexts where exposure may shape the attitudes of domestic actors toward democratic governance but trigger no automatic behavioral realization in view of likely negative consequences, such as being transferred to less attractive positions or losing the job.

Finally, existing studies on individual-level socialization demonstrate that the socialization effect observed appears to be rooted in experiences at the national rather than international level. The most prominent example is research on socialization as a process making participants in international organizations more 'international' or 'European' in outlook. Here it is demonstrated that support for supranational norms is relatively high, but that this is more because of self-selection or selective recruitment: national delegates sent to international organizations tend to already be pro-European or cosmopolitan before they start working at the supranational level (Pollack 1998; Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005). Consequently, existing studies tell us little about whether people are socialized once they are exposed to transnational norms but more about who is actually appointed as national delegate to international organizations. I will turn later to this important point when presenting the research design and discussing this study's implications. For the moment it shall suffice to emphasize that, in contrast to most existing work on international socialization, this study

explores a case where national socialization should generally work against transnational socialization and minimize rather than increase any observable effect. The attitudes of state officials employed by a stable authoritarian regime can be assumed to be negative in the absence of any external influences.

The Independent Socialization Effect of Transnational Influences

Studies on the diffusion of democratic norms point to an important role for international education and foreign media in the diffusion of democratic principles and practices. A number of Western countries actively finance foreign education (e.g., the U.S. Fulbright Program and the German Academic Exchange Service) and foreign media broadcasting (e.g., Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and Voice of America) in the hope of spreading specific Western liberal norms. However, these policies risk having the opposite effect of strengthening authoritarian regimes, as some studies have pointed out. For instance, if foreign media were used primarily as a source of entertainment it increased public support for the East German communist regime by “making life under communism more bearable and the East German regime more tolerable” (Kern and Hainmueller 2009: 378). Anecdotal evidence on foreign-educated leaders, in turn, suggests that studying in liberal democracies can lead to the rejection of liberal values such as in the example of Sayyid Qutb, the Islamic fundamentalist leader, whose experiences as a student in the United States (US) are said to have reinforced his belief in the moral decay of Western civilization (Spilimbergo 2009: 530). In this paper, however, I concentrate on the potential of transnational influences to socialize into democratic governance in authoritarian contexts.

Study visits abroad allow citizens of non-democratic states to experience democratic decision-making firsthand in a democratic country (Spilimbergo 2009). Transferred to the focus of this study, state officials’ understanding of appropriate governance is likely to be influenced by personal experiences of democratic governance when studying abroad for a

considerable period of time. “Through the exchange experience, participants (who may have little exposure to democratic norms and ideas) observe how people behave within a democratic system, acquire knowledge about how democracy [and democratic governance] functions, and learn what to expect of their own leaders and institutions” (Atkinson 2010: 2). Based on these arguments, I derive a first hypothesis on the independent effect of international education as follows:

H1: State officials in authoritarian regimes are more likely to have a positive attitude toward democratic governance when they have stayed abroad for educational or professional reasons in a Western democratic country (*international education*).

Officials can also become acquainted with democratic governance at home if they use foreign media for political information. The view that Western broadcasting nurtures pro-democratic attitudes and undermines public support for authoritarian regimes is widely shared (Wejnert 2005: 56; Levitsky and Way 2005; Kern and Hainmueller 2009). Exposure to foreign media is expected to familiarize state officials with democratic governance by confronting them with media content that delineates administrative practices in established democracies, exemplifies the involvement of the public in these processes, and reports on infringements against democratic governance. I therefore formulate a second research hypothesis on the independent socialization effect of foreign media:

H2: State officials in authoritarian regimes are more likely to have a positive attitude toward democratic governance when they regularly use Western media for political information (*foreign media*).

In addition to these two conventional transnational influences, I propose to probe into an alternative factor: transgovernmental networks. Transgovernmental networks can possibly trigger processes of democratic socialization as they provide a stage for social interaction and professional exchange among peers (Freyburg 2011; Slaughter and Zaring 2006: 214; Keohane and Nye 1974: 39). They bring specialists from the administrations of both

established democracies and authoritarian regimes “as individuals, together on a repeat basis” (Raustiala 2002: 55). Transgovernmental networks are meant to implement policy solutions and carry out legal requirements based on the standards of the administrations of the more developed countries that in most cases happen to also be more democratically constituted. The standards refer not only to substantive rules for regulating policy but also incorporate procedural rules on how decisions are to be made. Given that these procedural rules were developed for advanced democracies, in principle they embody elements of democratic governance (Freyburg, Lavenex *et al.* 2011). Since bureaucrats from Western countries are professionally socialized in a democratic polity, it is assumed that they apply and impart democratic governance when serving as experts abroad. As part of their advisory service, they address issues suppressed in domestic discourse such as the participation of non-state actors in administrative decision-making and the availability of information to the public. By participating in cooperative activities, state officials in non-democratic countries become introduced to democratic governance unknown under authoritarian rule. This assumption is corroborated by earlier studies that explored qualitatively whether national agents in Eastern candidate states became socialized into a set of liberal-democratic security norms due to their participation in exchange programs created by the National Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Flockhart 2004; Gheciu 2005). Based on the above considerations, I formulate a third hypothesis on the independent socialization effect of participation in transgovernmental policy networks:

H3: State officials in authoritarian regimes are more likely to have a positive attitude toward democratic governance when they have been involved in transgovernmental policy networks implementing functional cooperation (*transgovernmental networks*).

The 'Contact Hypothesis' and Democratic Socialization

The idea that transnational interchange between established liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes socializes the latter's bureaucrats into democratic governance is based on the assumption that people are socially influenced by what other people think and do. However, studies on international socialization (Beyers 2005; Hooghe 2005) and policy networks (Marsden 1990; Van Waarden 1992) only find weak support for the contact hypothesis if duration is used as proxy for contact. They conclude that contact alone represents a necessary condition for socialization and suggest that more substantial factors concerning the quality of contact are needed to measure socialization effects.

This proposition nicely echoes earlier social-psychological work. Research on processes predominantly related to prejudice, discrimination, and racism underscores the importance of interpersonal contact in changing attitudes. A wealth of research has provided empirical evidence "that, although the contact-attitude link is not large, intergroup contact typically improves attitudes toward both the specific individuals involved in contact and the outgroup as a whole" (Paolini, Harwood, *et al.* 2010: 1723). In particular, scholars exhaust Allport's influential work on the "contact hypothesis" (1954), which originally specified four critical situational conditions for intergroup contact, synthesized as "equal group status within the situation; common goals; intergroup cooperation; and the support of authorities, law, or custom" (Gaertner, Dovidio *et al.* 1996). The contact hypothesis has later been extended to include the effect of indirect forms of contact on attitudes such as mass-media contact. "Parasocial contact" is said to provide similar experiences to interpersonal contact, but only if media products can give "the illusion of face-to-face relationship with the performer" (Schiappa, Gregg *et al.* 2005: 93). In any case, existing studies by social and cross-cultural psychologists indicate "that superficial contact reduced to trivialities instead of meaningful communication" (Sigalas 2010: 248) is unlikely to shape attitudes. Importantly, in their meta-analysis of studies on the contact hypothesis, Pettigrew and Tropp (2000) demonstrate that not

all conditions need to be present simultaneously to shape attitudes. However, the more conditions are present the more likely it is that a successful and lasting outcome will be achieved. In brief, the set of conditions identified can be transferred to a broader understanding of contact in terms of exposure to transnational influences that encompasses both personal and impersonal contact. This expectation is corroborated by explanations grounded in sociology that point to the importance of practices in explaining social action. Here, social action is often realized through “doing” rather than normative compliance (Rohrschneider 1996) or practical knowledge (Pouliot 2008). Based on this reasoning, I expect that different kinds of transnational linkage produce democratic socialization to a varying extent.

Providing structured contact targeted at the transfer of rules originated in democracies, participation in transgovernmental networks fulfills the criteria best. Transgovernmental networks are created in order to implement cooperation that is requested by authoritarian elites seeking effective solutions to policy problems. This objective can only be reached if external and domestic state officials act in concert and exchange among professionals at eye level. Although visiting officials are often presented as “teachers”, the local staff knows the specific domestic conditions best. Contact in the framework of international education, in turn, is less structured and targeted (Merritt 1972). Study visits to democratic countries generally provide acquaintance potential as students’ daily life takes place in the culture and social structure of a democracy. The selection of interpersonal contacts is, however, up to them, and the extent to which they experience democratic governance is unknown. It might well be the case that their social contact is limited to other foreign students with a similar socialization background. Foreign media broadcasting, finally, presents the least structured and targeted form of exposure to transnational norms. In contrast to international education and transgovernmental networks, the use of foreign media products for political information does not necessarily provide the illusion of face-to-face contact. It is likely that state officials

using foreign media filter media products and accept only those pieces of information that fit into their familiar schemata of appropriate ways to make and implement policy decisions. This expectation is based on the “filter hypothesis” in research on media effects on individual voting behavior (Schmitt-Beck 2003: 258). Moreover, Western media tend to center on the pitfalls of bureaucracy rather than the advantages of democratic rule. Passive media consumption does not necessarily provide the possibility of dealing with cognitive dissonances and problems of comprehension in an interactive and cooperative interpersonal setting. Drawing on this reasoning, I expect a stronger socialization effect if state officials participate in policy networks than if they use foreign media or have stayed abroad in an established democracy, as summarized by the following contact hypothesis:

H3a: State officials in authoritarian regimes are more likely to have a positive attitude toward democratic governance when they have had contact with principles of democratic governance in a structured and targeted inter-personal manner; that is in networks rather than during a stay abroad or via foreign media (*contact type*).

However, the socialization potential of transgovernmental networks might be boosted by the influence of other transnational influences. Studies in psychology in the 1970s and 80s identify the “repetition effect” as being crucial for attitude change to occur. According to these studies, repetitive exposure facilitates the familiarization of individuals with complex arguments, as “the repetition of the message arguments provide[s] more opportunities to elaborate cognitively upon them and to realize their cogency and favorable implications” (Cacioppo and Petty 1979: 105). Following this line of reasoning, state officials that have had prior experiences with principles of democratic governance may be expected to be better disposed to change their attitudes when re-exposed to democratic governance. To give an example, officials might need to have cognitively learnt about democratic governance via various channels such as a stay abroad (but not necessarily consider democratic practices to be positive) so that subsequent exposure in the form of targeted interpersonal exchange within

transgovernmental networks can build on this knowledge and put it into a (more) favorable light. Drawing on this reasoning, I hypothesize that the likelihood of democratic socialization increases with the recurrence of exposure to democratic governance, as stated in the final hypothesis:

H3b: State officials in authoritarian regimes that have participated in transgovernmental networks are more likely to have a positive attitude toward democratic governance when they have previously been exposed to democratic governance (*prior experiences*).

Research Design

The question of whether transnational influences yield processes of democratic socialization is tested by means of multiple regression analyses on cross-sectional data from a survey among 150 Moroccan state officials that I conducted in summer 2008. The survey data contains responses from 98 males and 52 females; the mean age is 41 with lower and upper quartiles of 25 and 57. Respondents could choose the language of communication, French or Arabic; 9 per cent chose the Arabic version. The questionnaire was cognitively pre-tested on knowledgeable experts (Presser, Rothgeb *et al.* 2004).

To determine the effect of transnational influences on the attitudes of Moroccan state officials toward democratic governance, I apply a “static-group comparison design” (Campbell and Stanley 1966: 12). That is, I statistically compare the attitudes toward democratic governance of two groups of state officials at a single point in time, one of which has received the treatment (here: exposure to transnational influences) and the other has not. The effect of transnational influences is defined as the difference between the attitudes of these two groups, while including explicit controls for relevant alternative influences. Discussion of the causality problem in such cross-sectional comparison design points to two conditions that must be established before an acceptable causal inference can be drawn: it needs to be guaranteed that, first, the allocation of officials to the focus and comparison

groups is not determined by extraneous factors that are not included in the analyses, and, second, that the two groups are similar in all relevant characteristics. Only if the individuals in both groups do not considerably differ with regard to third, possibly confounding, features on average and with a sufficiently large sample size, can the difference in attitude be reliably associated with the treatment effect.

I opted for theoretically controlled cluster sampling to address a possible selection bias since it was not possible to get comprehensive and reliable information about the larger population of Moroccan state officials that would have been necessary to gain a sufficiently representative and random sample. In line with this procedure, I asked all the officials working in particular departments of certain ministries (i.e. the clusters) to participate. Given the study's focus on the potential democratizing effects of transgovernmental networks, and assuming that the use of foreign media and international education among state officials is not determined by the policy field in which they work, the departments were selected on the basis of their participation or non-participation, respectively, in a network. Specifically, I centered on the EU Twinning program, because it presents a highly institutionalized type of inter-administrative cooperation that builds on the secondment of European experts in public administration from their partner countries for a maximum of two years.² All state officials working in a benefiting department belong, in principle, to the target group of such a project. In a few cases a Twinning project also involves individual state officials in different but thematically relevant ministries/departments, which are also included in the survey. Drawing on this selection of benefiting departments, I identified additional thematically similar departments in ministries that were not subject to any EU Twinning project. To give an example, the project 'Support for the Strengthening of the Competition Authorities' (MA06/AA/FI08) benefits the Department for Competition and Prices of the Moroccan Ministry for Economic and General Affairs. A suitable comparable department is, for instance, the Department for Treasury and External Finances of the Ministry for Economy and

External Finances. State officials working in these non-benefiting departments generally constitute the comparison group for the treatment “network”. In addition, some officials were however transferred to the treatment group due to their involvement in comparable programs, i.e. policy reform programs other than the EU Twinning project that likewise center day-to-day contact in seminars, workshops, training sessions and meetings on the basis of normal work relations between Moroccan and foreign state officials. Overall, there is no bias with regard to the ministries selected, although state officials employed by the Ministry of Economy and Exterior Finances, the Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Development and Fishing, and the Ministry of Energy, Mining, Environment and Water are over-represented as they hosted EU Twinning projects (see Table OA.1). The overview also demonstrates that there is no bias with regard to more market-oriented versus supply-side policy fields that might differ in their openness to public needs, with the latter being better disposed. Personal distribution of the closed-ended questionnaire to the state officials working in the departments selected on site enabled a response rate of approximately 96 per cent; almost all the officials available during the period of three months responded.³ In brief, I can exclude the possibility that only those state officials who are particularly open-minded, or alternatively loyal to the regime, agreed to fill in the questionnaire.

Nevertheless, this procedure, commonly applied in research on socialization, runs the risk of identifying the effect of self-selection or selective recruitment rather than that of the treatment in focus (Kerr 1973; Pollack 1998; Hooghe 2005). It is hence important to control for the possibility that only a particular group of state officials is exposed to a specific type of influence. Descriptive statistics of the sample distribution show no systematic pattern in the distribution of conventional socio-demographic characteristics and position within the state administration across the three different types of transnational influence (see Table OA.1); overall, the sample appears to be large and diverse enough to draw meaningful conclusions. Both senior officials responsible for the management of the relevant administrative unit

(‘directorate’) and junior and middle level officials (‘administrative staff’) are represented in a similar manner. The same holds true for education level (graduate or postgraduate studies) and subject (law/economics, natural sciences, public administration). People that are exposed to transnational influences are, as expected, more likely to speak foreign languages than their colleagues (which can, however, be both a motivation for and a consequence of transnational interchange). Repetition of the regression analyses with data matched on those variables that are assumed to motivate exposure produces similar results (see Table OA.6). That is, if I control for a potential selection bias the results of the regression analyses remain robust.

Moreover, summary statistics of attitudes toward democratic governance by group do not corroborate the expectation that state officials’ exposure to transnational influences is driven by pre-existing attitudes or depends on loyalties associated with particular attitudes (see Figure 1). The appointment of state officials as participants in policy reform programs is not based on specific individual characteristics; rather the selected projects target all state officials working in benefiting departments. In contrast to network participants, however, foreign media users and international students tend to be a self-selected group. It is thinkable that only those can afford to study abroad, who have either close links to the political elite and/or are perceived as regime supporters in order to strengthen their loyalty and avoid undesired effects such as those studied in this paper. Foreign media use, in turn, can be assumed to be more attractive for state officials that are generally open toward external influences and interested in developments taking place in democratic foreign countries. That is, while in the case of foreign media I expect self-selection to bias any observed effect upwards, meaning to increase the significance of the correlation coefficient, with regard to international education, self-selection should negatively influence the significance of the correlation coefficient. Figure 1 demonstrates that the two distributions are surprisingly similar. It appears that the treated group ‘international education’ does not show a particularly negative attitude toward democratic governance, as should be expected if self-selection was

true (or the effect of study abroad must be extremely strong). Likewise, the attitudes of the state officials using foreign media do not appear to be considerably more positive. While this question deserves additional research, descriptive statistics allow for the tentative conclusion that if self-selection applies, it seems to have no major influence.

Operationalization of the Treatment Variables

The variable 'Foreign Media' applies to Western print media and television channels. Respondents were asked to indicate which newspapers/magazines and television channels they use for political information, in which languages, and how often they do so. The media products used originate predominantly in Europe – about 97 per cent of foreign print media and 94 per cent of foreign TV channels. Media penetration is treated as dichotomous with 1 representing regular use. The second transnational variable 'International Education' refers to the international experiences of officials, operationalized as a stay abroad of at least six months for educational or professional reasons in the 'old' member states of the European Union (EU) and/or North America (NA). This variable is coded as a binary variable with 1 for residence in the EU and/or in the United States/Canada (N = 9 only NA, N = 6 NA and EU). There are no significant differences in attitude toward democratic governance between officials who had spent a considerable period of time in Europe and those who had been in North America or in both host destinations, as shown by a non-significant ANOVA F-test ($F(3) = 0.53, p = .66$). Overall, 63 state officials had stayed abroad in a Western established democracy for educational or professional reasons. Officials who had spent a considerable time in 'the West' do not consult Western media substantially more often, as supported by a non-significant Pearson's Chi-squared test ($\chi^2(1, N=150)=0.394, p = .53$). Finally, the third variable, participation in 'Transgovernmental Networks' is entered as a binary variable with value 1 if the official had participated in at least one policy reform program. In total, 76 per cent had participated in activities provided by a policy program that was set up by the EU

(56.7 per cent), its Member states (30.7 per cent)⁴, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 18.7 per cent), the United States Agency for International Development Aid (USAID, 23.3 per cent), the World Bank (24.7 per cent), or the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA, 13.3 per cent). The percentages total more than 100 since some officials had participated in more than one network. All programs are implemented through daily interactions between foreign state officials and their Moroccan counterparts.

Operationalization of the Dependent Variable: Democratic Socialization

The dependent variable is democratic socialization, understood as change in attitude toward democratic governance. Democratic governance involves the idea that democratic principles may be applicable to every situation in which collectively binding decisions are taken (Dahl 1971: 12; Beetham 1999: 4-5). These principles can thus be translated into administrative rules and practices at the level of sub-units of state administration, even within a non-democratic polity. Unlike good governance, democratic governance is not limited to the effectiveness and efficiency but includes the legitimization of governance through democratic rules and practices. Enhancing the legitimacy of governance requires more than simply delivering more, better or faster services. Instead, the conditions for increasing legitimacy include undertaking initiatives focused on making public-sector activities more transparent, accountable, interactive and accessible to citizens. Governance-driven democratization increases the chances that those affected by collective decisions made at the administrative level will have some chance to influence those decisions. Attitudes toward democratic governance thus capture state officials' understandings of the extent to which and the way in which public affairs shall be managed in respect of the citizens' right to govern themselves.

Since this study could not build on existing surveys, it required the creation of an original scale to measure the degree of agreement with democratic governance. Although I concur with authors such as Freyburg, Lavenex *et al.* (2011) who argue that democratic

governance likely represents a multidimensional construct encompassing three core dimensions (participation, transparency, and accountability), for the purpose of this study my interest was to develop a concise, construct valid measure with acceptable properties of administrative decision-making, suitable to conduct initial explorations in this area. Conceptual work on public administration (reform) and the linkage between (good) governance and development inspired the formulation of statement items pertaining to various aspects of democratic administrative governance (Baker 2002; Hyden, Court *et al.* 2004).

Table 1 displays the exact wording of the eight statement items and the results of a basic reliability analysis for the attitude toward democratic governance scale. Each of the items is measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1=strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree) and summed to create an index ranging from 8 to 40, with higher total scores reflecting a greater agreement with democratic governance. The internal reliability of the created scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = .62$) is acceptable given the exploratory character of the study, its objective (attitudes), the skewness of the item distribution and the small number of observations (John and Benet-Martínez 2000: 346). I cross-checked the results' validity by running the regression analyses on a scale without item 4 that correlates low with the overall score of the scale; the estimation results are similar (see Table OA.5). I thus believe that the scale reflects a construct valid measure of attitudes toward democratic governance and keep item 4 for its theoretical importance.

[Table 1 about here]

Despite the precautions taken in questionnaire design and survey setting, the existence of preference falsification cannot be completely ruled out. For predominantly two reasons this hardly signifies a problem for this study. First, I am not primarily interested in identifying the true understanding of appropriate governance among Moroccan state officials. Instead, I am concerned with estimating the difference in agreement with democratic governance between state officials who have been exposed to transnational influences and those who have not. It

can essentially be assumed that there is no systematic bias of response tendencies; a socialization effect can therefore not be ascribed to the effect of preference falsification. Second, in this study response behavior that is conventionally problematized as social desirability bias is covered by the measurement of the dependent variable. As a consequence of their professional exchange with bureaucrats from established democracies, Moroccan officials might have learnt what kind of governance is seen as appropriate by their Western counterparts and therefore tend to agree with statements describing democratic governance. In other words, socially desirable response behavior requires prior cognitive learning processes and, as such, it can be seen as a feature of democratic socialization.

[Figure 1 about here]

The distribution of the outcome variable is shown by four violin plots, one plot per transnational influence plus one for ‘Transnational influences’ in general, as displayed in Figure 1. ‘Transnational influences’ is operationalized with 1 if the individual state official is exposed to at least one of the three types of transnational influence. The white circles give the median values, the black boxes connect the 25th and 75th percentiles and the black lines connect the lower to the upper adjacent value. A cursory glance suggests that transnational influences (plot at the top left) have no notable effect on the attitudes toward democratic governance of exposed third state officials: overall, the median values are comparably high for the treated group (‘yes’) and the comparison group (‘no’). A comparison of the shape suggests, however, that while the attitude of a considerable number of state officials belonging to the treated group has become more positive (more middle values fall into the upper half of the plot), it has also become more negative for others (lower adjacent values). Figure 1 also points, as expected, to variance in the effect between the different types of transnational influences. Most strikingly, it shows a similar distribution for the respective treated and comparison groups of the more diffuse types of transnational influence with similar median values and interquartile ranges, international education and foreign media, and

a noticeably different distribution for the third type, transgovernmental networks. The main difference is that, overall, participation in policy networks seems to have positively influenced the attitudes of the concerned state officials: the majority of data points accumulated in the upper range and the tail is considerably shorter. It is generally noticeable that all groups show a remarkably high degree of agreement with the attitude to democratic governance statements given that the respondents are state officials employed by an authoritarian regime reluctant to any noteworthy political liberalization: the middle values and the median values are clearly located in the realm of a positive attitude toward democratic governance. How do state officials employed in a non-democratic environment come to appreciate democratic elements of governance? And, are the visually detected differences in the attitudes of officials exposed to different types of transnational influences statistically significant?

Empirical Results

Quantitative Analysis of Survey Data

In order to examine the effect of transnational influences, here foreign media, international education, and transgovernmental networks on Moroccan state officials' understanding of appropriate administrative governance, I conduct a number of multiple least square regression analyses. I first calculate three models of the independent effects of the three types of transnational influences. This step allows Hypothesis 3a to be tested on the difference in socialization between the three types, and the expected stronger effect of participation in transgovernmental networks (Models 1 to 3). In Model 4 I then regress all three types together on agreement with democratic governance, the dependent variable. Model 5 introduces the control variables related to relevant characteristics of the individual state officials, namely their level of education (with graduate = 0 and postgraduate studies = 1), the subject of study (Law / Economics, Public Administration, or Natural Sciences, introduced as dummy variables with the latter as baseline), their knowledge of English and French (with 1 for

‘good’ knowledge, i.e. scores ≥ 3 on scale ranging from 5 (‘excellent’) 0 (‘no knowledge’)), their position within the state administration (with directorate = 1), age, and gender (with female = 1). Table 2 presents the estimation results for the likelihood of the individual transnational influences shaping state officials’ attitude toward democratic governance even though they are employed in an authoritarian polity. The results generally support the democratizing potential of transnational influences – however, as expected, not all transnational influences yield democratic socialization to the same extent.

[Table 2 here]

Contrary to conventional wisdom, state officials who use foreign media for political information or have stayed abroad in an established democracy are not more supportive of democratic governance than their colleagues who have not been exposed to these transnational influences. Instead, in both cases the coefficient is even slightly (but not significantly) negative, which points to an anti-democratic effect. However, as expected, participation in transgovernmental policy networks positively shapes the attitudes of the state officials involved toward democratic governance. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant; this finding remains stable if we control for the influence of other transnational influences and socio-demographic control factors. The estimation results speak against Hypotheses 1 and 2 on the independent effect of international education and foreign media use. Instead, they support Hypothesis 3 on the transformative potential of participation in transgovernmental networks. In this vein, the regression results corroborate Hypothesis 3a on variance in effect between different types of transnational interchange. As hypothesized, exposure to transnational norms is more likely to shape the attitudes of state officials if they have contact with democratic governance in a structured and targeted interpersonal manner.

To what extent does it matter whether state officials have been exposed to more than one type of transnational interchange? In order to test the conditional effect (Hypothesis 3b), cross-product terms of the three contact variables are introduced in Model 5 (see Table OA.3).

I estimate the marginal effect of the interaction term with a 95 % confidence interval based on simulations (N = 1000). It can be safely assumed that state officials studied abroad before they entered public administration. Whereas it seems that the use of foreign media neither fosters nor limits the effect of either inter-administrative cooperation or international education (Model 7 and 8 in Figure 2), the marginal effect of participation in transgovernmental networks on the attitudes of state officials with international experience is with a coefficient of $\beta = 4.50$, $t(96) = 2.95$, $p = 0.004$ substantial and positive (Model 6), as is also corroborated by a significant Wald test result on Model 6 ($p = 0.004$; $df = 11$; $\chi^2 = 8.724$). In substantial terms this means that on a scale from 8 to 40 composed of 5 categories from ‘strongly non-democratic’ to ‘strongly democratic’, the attitude of a state official involved in a network jumps almost straight into the next higher category if she studied in a democratic country. The effect remains significant if one accounts for a potential selection bias by applying matching techniques (see Table OA.5). Figure 2 illustrates the findings graphically.

[Figure 2 here]

Qualitative Analysis of Interviews and Answers to Open Survey Questions

Interviews with European officials in 2007 and 2008, and the written answers to an open survey question by the Moroccan officials are used to evaluate the plausibility of democratic socialization in transgovernmental networks. I interviewed in total 15 officials from the European Commission and EU Member states that were recruited on the basis of their responsibilities. In addition, concluding the questionnaire, all Moroccan officials were asked whether they “have any further remarks as regards the reality of bureaucratic structures in Morocco and [... their] daily work”. Overall, 42 officials shared their comments; half of them had participated in a transgovernmental network. Since it is difficult to assess the uncertainty

involved in drawing inferences from this non-representative sample, this qualitative material is used only to illustrate the plausibility of the argument.

Overall, the interviews corroborate the finding that state officials can become acquainted with democratic governance through participation in transgovernmental networks. According to one interviewee, Twinning projects are “administrative reality” (EU7)⁵, in that cooperation happens within state administration: European experts settle down in the benefitting ministries for a few years in order to work jointly on solutions to policy problems on a daily basis. The projects thus, another European official (EU2) emphasized, offer “activities trying to help [... the state officials of the partner country to] understand better what they have to do in order to fulfill the agreements and how to progress. [...] They] have to change their minds about how to organize things”. In a similar vein, one of the project leaders (EU12) reasoned that the participating Moroccan officials “get the feeling that it could work differently and appraise that the Twinning project asks them to take up the initiative and to think actively. [...] They regret that they cannot work like this outside the program”.

This observation corresponds to the Moroccan officials’ self-reports: The majority of the respondents complained about the hierarchical top-down structure of Moroccan state administration and the lack of performance-based career advancement; two-third of them was network participants. As one 34-year old participant in an environmental network put it: “The Moroccan government is deeply marked by corruption, demotivation, lack of protection of the rights of employees against the hierarchical abuse of power, disorganization, irresponsibility, and other related malaise” (MA7).⁶ This general discontent with the functioning of administration was echoed in personal communication with officials after they had filled in the questionnaire. When asked how satisfied they are with their jobs, many reported that they appreciated being called on to reflect on the policy problem at stake and to produce possible solutions themselves. They would welcome having more responsibility and the possibility of working closer to the concerns of the population.

With regard to democratic modes of governance precisely, most officials who answered the concluding survey question complained about the lack of transparency, in particular in terms of administrative procedures of decision-making and the internal exchange of information between different branches of administration but also the diffusion of information to citizens. Many explicitly mentioned the lack of mechanisms holding officials accountable. In the words of a 52-year old officials working in the Secretary of Water and Environment, “Administrative work is not sufficiently controlled in terms of its efficiency and regulatory correctness. [...] Appeals against the decision of the administration are rarely brought before the courts” (MA4). Importantly, a number of respondents noted that “the mentality of the officials” (MA14) needs to change. A 46-year old participant in the EU-financed policy program on free commercial trade at borders specified that due to the “non-reactivity between administration and citizens [...] administration is perceived by the people as power and not as public service to meet their needs”. His 35-year old colleague concurred by saying that “the attitudes of the state officials towards citizens needs to change” (MA13). State officials are needed that are “close to the citizens, ambitious, conscious, and take on responsibility” (MA10).

Conclusion

“Change through rapprochement” is a slogan often used to promote political liberalization through a policy that gradually relies upon the magnetic force of political liberties and economic opportunities. This policy of proximity is based on the assumption that transnational interchange creates channels of diffusion, changing the attitudes if not the behavior of domestic agents in authoritarian regimes in terms of the democratic making and implementation of decisions. Social-psychological research on social interaction between groups and its effects on prejudices teaches us that socialization effects depend on the quality of contact (“contact hypothesis”): the more structured and direct exposure occurs, the more

likely it is to shape attitudes. Insights from sociology that fed the “practice turn” in International Relations point to the importance of experiential learning by doing. Drawing on this, the present study set out with two main suppositions: first, if the theoretical assumptions on attitude change through exposure to transnational influences are correct, there should be a relationship between exposure to democratic governance and attitudes toward it; and second, this relationship should be stronger if exposure happens in a structured and targeted interpersonal setting that guarantees direct contact and allows for practicing.

Multiple least square estimations on original data from a survey among 150 Moroccan state officials have shown that, as expected, not all types of transnational interchange yield processes of democratic socialization. Contrary to conventional wisdom, I find no significant effect of exposure to foreign media or from international education on attitudes toward democratic governance. This finding casts doubt on the effectiveness of study abroad programs and foreign media broadcasting as tools for democracy transfer although, on the basis of the present analysis, it cannot be concluded that international education or foreign media *per se* are unlikely to yield democratic socialization; further studies are needed to control more explicitly for factors such as the quality of actual contact with democratic governance.

Instead, my analyses suggest that a hitherto overlooked type of transnational exchange –transgovernmental networks – can positively influence the attitudes of the state officials involved. State officials who have participated in the activities of policy reform programs undertaken by established democracies show a higher agreement with democratic modes of administrative decision-making than their non-participating colleagues. The results advance the conclusion that international factors can yield processes of socialization into transnational norms, but only if they create a site for interpersonal and structured exchange bringing together people from democratic and non-democratic countries. Networks provide the opportunity to become acquainted with democratic principles and practices at the elbow of a

master. By applying abstract democratic principles to everyday practices, they can be seen as a kind of apprenticeship in democratic governance. This study of Moroccan state officials' attitudes and whether they are shaped by transnational influences represents one step toward a better understanding of the democratization potential of transnational influences. Although the results presented cannot provide a comprehensive explanation, they suggest transgovernmental networks between democratic and non-democratic countries be a promising venue for democratic socialization. Future research is encouraged to explore which types of networks are more effective, under what conditions, and why.

Endnotes

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- 1 An Online Appendix (OA) containing supplemental information on the analyses and additional robustness checks will be made available on the author's website.
 - 2 For more information on the EU's Twinning program see http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/overview/twinning_en.htm.
 - 3 Only one official flatly refused to fill in the questionnaire; fewer than five officials could not be reached because of professional commitments abroad or vacation.
 - 4 Programs financed by the EU but implemented by the Member States are counted as EU programs; Member state programs are set up by national agencies such as the German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ) or the French Development Agency (AFD).
 - 5 See Table OA.4 in the appendix for more information; European officials are labelled EU1 to EU3, and Moroccan officials MA1 to MA15.
 - 6 All citations are translated from French and Arabic by the author.

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TABLES

TABLE 1 Measurement of Attitude toward Democratic Governance

	Exact wording of the statement item	(1)	(2)	mean	s.d.	N
Question: ‘There are different opinions as to what it takes to be a ‘good’ civil servant. To what extent do you personally agree or disagree that a civil servant should have the following qualities?’						
1	‘A civil servant should provide citizens with the possibility of advancing their views as an input for governmental decision making’	.40	.35	4.51	0.71	144
2	‘A civil servant should take into account the views and concerns of affected citizens before making decisions’	.50	.53	4.63	0.71	145
3	‘A civil servant should ensure that the citizens’ views and concerns have an influence on shaping policies’	.48	.50	4.47	0.72	142
4	‘A civil servant should make information available to anyone requesting it’	.05	X	4.62	0.81	146
5	‘A civil servant should work in a manner that is transparent and comprehensible for the general public’	.30	.23	4.85	0.41	147
6	‘A civil servant should offer updated information on governmental policy’	.40	.44	4.42	0.82	139
Question: ‘There are different understandings of what determines the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts in public administration. To what extent do you personally agree that the following items serve this function?’						
7	‘Monitoring by independent state institutions ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts’	.34	.40	4.24	1.03	136
8	‘Possibilities for the general public and its associations to request scrutiny of the decision-making process and review of policies ensures the appropriateness and procedural correctness of bureaucratic acts’	.19	.20	4.28	0.94	135
overall reliability α		.62	.66			

Note: Entries for two different scales (columns 1 and 2) are the corrected item-total correlations, i.e. the correlation of the respective item with the scale total excluding that item; scale 2 excludes item 4 as it correlates low with the overall scale score. Items are measured on a 5-point Likert-type scale (1=strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).


TABLE 2 Transnational Influences and Attitudes toward Democratic Governance

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Treatment Variables</i>					
Foreign media	-0.50 (0.81)			-1.01 (0.83)	-1.14 (0.86)
Internat. education		-0.41 (0.62)		-0.59 (0.65)	-0.26 (0.74)
Transgov. Networks			1.39* (0.69)	1.76* (0.74)	2.20** (0.82)
<i>Control Variables</i>					
Directorate					-1.24 (0.71)
Postgraduate					0.48 (0.72)
Study subject					
Law/ Econ.					1.29 (0.76)
Public admin.					2.02 (1.11)
Natural Science (base category)					
Languages					
English					-0.18 (0.84)
French					-1.87 (3.4)
Women					0.30 (0.74)
Age					0.06 (0.05)
Intercept	36.23*** (0.73)	36.00*** (0.40)	34.84*** (0.59)	35.53*** (0.82)	34.29*** (4.03)
<i>Adjusted R</i> ²	-0.005	-0.005	0.026	0.033	0.059
<i>AIC</i>	606.6399	623.8063	635.5824	588.7213	583.5304
<i>N</i>	114	118	121	111	109

Note: Coefficients of multiple least square regression analyses are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; missing cases deleted listwise; * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .000$.


FIGURES

FIGURE 1 Moroccan State Officials' Attitudes toward Democratic Governance



Note: Values range from 8 (“non-democratic”) to 40 (“democratic”); N = 150, cases with missing values excluded listwise.

FIGURE 2 Interaction Effects on Attitudes toward Democratic Governance



Note: Differences in mean values based on Model 5 including the respective interaction effect; 95 % confidence interval based on simulations (N = 1000).

ONLINE APPENDIX

This appendix will be made available at the author's website. It contains the basic information of all variables presented in the manuscript and additional robustness checks that are not reported in detail in the paper due to space constraints. Not all robustness checks are summarized in a table, but can be replicated via the corresponding online material or are available from the author upon request.

Basic Information

TABLE OA.1 Distribution of Sample

	Foreign media			Intern. education			Transgov. networks		
	no	yes	<i>N</i>	no	yes	<i>N</i>	no	yes	<i>N</i>
MINISTRIES									
<i>Market-oriented</i>									
▪ Economy and Exterior Finances	8	19	27	21	8	29	9	20	29
▪ Foreign Commerce	0	2	2	1	1	2	0	2	2
▪ Economic and General Affairs	2	7	9	6	4	10	0	10	10
▪ Industry, Trade, and New Technologies	1	3	4	3	1	4	3	1	4
▪ Agriculture, Rural Development and Fishing	5	26	31	14	19	33	6	27	33
<i>N</i>	16	57	73	45	33	74	18	60	78
<i>Supply-side</i>									
▪ Equipment and Transport	1	5	6	3	3	6	3	3	6
▪ Energy, Mining, Environment and Water	3	36	39	22	16	38	4	37	41
▪ Housing, Urban Development and Planning	1	4	5	4	1	5	3	2	5
▪ National Education, Higher Education, and Scientific Research	5	2	7	4	4	8	5	3	8
▪ Health	3	8	11	6	6	12	3	9	12
<i>N</i>	13	55	68	39	30	73	19	53	72

TABLE OA.1 Distribution of Sample (~continued)

	Foreign media			Intern. education			Transgov. networks		
	no	yes	<i>N</i>	no	yes	<i>N</i>	no	yes	<i>N</i>
STATE OFFICIALS									
<i>Position</i>									
Directorate	9	54	63	31	33	64	13	53	66
Administrative staff	20	58	60	53	30	83	23	61	84
<i>Education level</i>									
University diploma	13	38	51	37	16	53	17	37	54
Postgraduate	15	74	89	46	47	93	19	76	95
<i>Subject of Study</i>									
Law / Economics	13	42	55	41	17	58	37	21	68
Natural sciences	10	60	70	33	39	72	65	10	85
Public admin.	4	9	13	9	5	14	9	5	14
<i>Languages</i>									
French	29	111	140	83	62	145	36	112	148
English	20	89	91	63	51	78	28	87	115
<i>N</i>	29	112	141	84	63	147	36	114	150

Note: Frequencies in numbers; Foreign language competences range from excellent knowledge (5) to no knowledge (0); scores between three and five are valued as good knowledge and indicated in the Table.

Table OA.2 Basic information of variables

<i>Dependent Variable</i>										
		Mean	Median	s.d.	Min.	Max.	N			
Democratic Governance		35.88	36	3.33	24	40	121			
<i>Sub-groups</i>										
Foreign media	control	36.23	36.5	3.1	30	40	22			
	treated	35.73	36	3.47	24	40	92			
Itnt. education	control	36	36	3.16	29	40	69			
	treated	35.59	36	3.59	24	40	49			
Networks	control	34.84	36	4.18	24	40	31			
	treated	36.23	36	2.93	29	40	90			
<i>Treatment Variables</i>										
		Freq. '0'	Freq. '1'				N	(1)	(2)	(3)
Foreign media (1)		19.3	74.7				141	1.00		
Itnt. education (2)		56.0	42.0				147	0.07	1.00	
Networks (3)		24.0	76.0				150	0.25**	0.11	1.00
<i>Control Variables</i>										
Directorate		56.0	44.0				150			
Postgraduate		54.0	95.0				149			
<i>Study subject</i>										
Law / Econ.		61.3	38.7				150			
Public admin.		50	50				150			
Natural Sc.		90.7	9.3				150			
<i>Languages</i>										
French		98.7	1.3				150			
English		76.7	23.3				150			
Women		65.3	34.7				150			
<i>Age</i>										
		Mean	Median	s.d.	Min.	Max.	N			
Age		40.65	40	7.95	25	57	147			

Note: Frequencies in percentage; N = number of valid observations; one-tailed p-value of non-parametric Spearman-Rho coefficients, * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .000$.

Table OA.3 Regression analyses with interaction terms

	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Treatment Variables</i>			
Foreign media	-0.39 (0.87)	-0.51 (1.34)	-1.21 (1.12)
Internat. Education	-3.57** (1.33)	-0.33 (0.75)	-0.41 (1.69)
Trans. Networks	0.44 (0.98)	3.03* (1.58)	2.21** (0.84)
<i>Interaction Variables</i>			
Education x networks	4.50** (1.52)		
Media x networks		-1.11 (1.80)	
Media x education			0.18 (1.81)
<i>Control Variables</i>			
Women	0.27 (0.71)	0.26 (0.74)	0.29 (0.75)
Age	0.04 (0.05)	0.05 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Directorate	-0.98 (0.69)	-1.26 (0.72)	-1.23 (0.73)
Postgraduate	0.32 (0.69)	0.51 (0.72)	0.49 (0.72)
Subject of Study			
Law/economics	1.26 (0.73)	1.33 (0.77)	1.29 (0.76)
Public admin.	2.41* (1.08)	1.95 (1.13)	2.02 (1.12)
Languages			
English	-0.23 (0.80)	-.013 (0.84)	-0.18 (0.84)
French	-2.47 (3.28)	-1.86 (3.41)	-1.88 (3.42)
Intercept	36.21*** (3.94)	34.03*** (4.07)	34.34*** (4.09)
	<i>Adjusted R²</i>	0.129	0.054
	<i>AIC</i>	576.0493	585.0994
	<i>N</i>	119	119

Note: Coefficients of multiple least square regression analyses are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; cases with missing values deleted listwise; * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .000$.

TABLE OA.4 Interview codes

Code	Date and place	Details
<i>Interviews with European officials</i>		
EU1	December 2007, Brussels	European Commission, DG AIDCO.
EU2	December 2007, Brussels	European Commission, DG ENTERPRISE.
EU3	December 2007, Brussels	European Commission, DG JLS.
EU4	December 2007, Brussels	European Commission, DG RELEX.
EU5	December 2007, Brussels	European Commission, DG RELEX.
EU6	December 2007, Brussels	European Commission, DG RELEX.
EU7	December 2007, Brussels	European Commission, DG TRADE.
EU8	Summer 2008, Rabat	European Commission, DG RELEX.
EU9	Summer 2008, Rabat	European Commission, DG RELEX.
EU10	Summer 2008, Rabat	European Commission, DG RELEX.
EU11	Summer 2008, Rabat	European Commission, DG RELEX.
EU12	Summer 2008, Rabat	Project Leader, German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ)
EU13	Summer 2008, Rabat	Project Leader, German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ)
EU14	Summer 2008, Rabat	Project Leader, Italian Customs Agency
EU15	Summer 2008, Rabat	Project Leader French Development Agency (AFD)
<i>Answers to open survey question by Moroccan officials</i>		
MA1	Summer 2008, Rabat	50 years, Network participant, State Secretary of Water and Environment
MA2	Summer 2008, Rabat	38 years, Network participant, State Secretary of Water and Environment
MA3	Summer 2008, Rabat	35 years, Network participant, State Secretary of Water and Environment
MA4	Summer 2008, Rabat	52 , Non-participant, State Secretary of Water and Environment
MA5	Summer 2008, Rabat	41 years, Network participant, State Secretary of Water and Environment
MA6	Summer 2008, Rabat	Age unknown, Network participant, State Secretary of Water and Environment
MA7	Summer 2008, Rabat	34 years, , Network participant, State Secretary of Water and Environment
MA8	Summer 2008, Rabat	39 years, Network participant, State Secretary of Water and Environment
MA9	Summer 2008, Rabat	40 years, Network participant, State Secretary of Water and Environment
MA10	Summer 2008, Rabat	39 years, Non-participant, Ministry of Housing, Urban Development and Planning
MA11	Summer 2008, Rabat	32 years, Non-participant, Ministry of Health
MA12	Summer 2008, Rabat	39 years, Non-participant, Ministry of Health
MA13	Summer 2008, Rabat	35 years, Non-participant, Ministry of Economy and Exterior Finances
MA14	Summer 2008, Rabat	46 years, Network participant, Ministry of Economy and Exterior Finances
MA15	Summer 2008, Rabat	52 years, Network participant, Ministry of Economy and Exterior Finances

Robustness

In order to ensure the robustness of my findings, I changed two model specifications and ran the estimates again. First, I excluded the one item that only poorly inter-correlated with the overall score of the scale measuring a state official's attitude toward democratic governance. Item 4 correlates only weakly with the overall score of the scale ($r(113) = .046, p = .016$), see Table 1 in the main text. Cronbach's α increases from $\alpha = .62$ to $\alpha = .66$ if item 4 is removed. For this reason, I re-ran the regression analyses on a scale without this item. As Table OA.5 shows, the estimation results are similar. Participation in a transgovernmental network is statistically significantly and positively related to agreement with democratic modes of governance. This finding remains stable if one controls for alternative influences. With regard to a mediated effect of networks dependent on a stay abroad in a democratic country, the corresponding interaction term significantly predicts agreement with democratic governance, $b = 4.34, t(97) = 3.03, p = .003$ (full model). The alternative interaction terms – 'network x media' and 'media x stay abroad' – are not statistically significantly related to agreement with democratic governance. I therefore kept item 4 for theoretical reasons as it captures an important aspect of transparent governance, which is access to information for citizens and media representatives.

TABLE OA.5 Regression results with modified scale

	(1a)	(2a)	(3a)	(4a)	(5a)
<i>Treatment Variables</i>					
Foreign media	-0.29 (0.77)			-0.77 (0.79)	-0.83 (0.81)
Internat. education		-0.42 (0.60)		-0.67 (0.62)	-0.29 (0.69)
Transgov. Networks			1.37* (0.66)	1.69* (0.71)	2.09** (0.77)
<i>Control Variables</i>					
Directorate					-1.57* (0.67)
Postgraduate					0.47 (0.68)
Study subject					
Law/ Econ.					1.14 (0.71)
Public admin.					1.78 (1.05)
Natural Science (base category)					
Languages					
English					-0.32 (0.79)
French					-1.21 (3.21)
Women					0.16 (0.70)
Age					0.05 (0.05)
Intercept	31.41*** (0.69)	31.38*** (0.39)	30.23*** (0.57)	30.77*** (0.78)	29.69*** (3.80)
Adjusted R ²	-0.008	-0.004	0.027	0.033	0.07
AIC	600.7965	619.3165	630.2398	583.2175	576.2057
N	115	119	122	112	110

Note: Coefficients of multiple least square regression analyses are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; missing cases deleted listwise; * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .000$.

Second, I replicated the analyses by employing genetic one-to-one matching with replacement (Diamond and Sekhon 2008). According to this pre-processing method, observations are selected on the basis of relevant alternative explanatory variables in order to make the treatment and control covariate distributions more similar, that is to account for possible confounding effects, notably an artefact effect of exposure based on self-selection. I apply the technique separately for the two traditional types of transnational influences, international education and foreign media, for which self-selection cannot be ruled out. Due to the limited number of contrast cases for foreign media (N=50 out of 150), I reverse the procedure and match the two groups based on the contrast group. Observations that cannot be matched well to either group are discarded because they may otherwise bias the analysis. Missing data on

the independent variables introduced in the matching procedure have been excluded listwise. I assess the similarity between the distribution of covariates within the treated and control groups ('optimal balance') on the basis of the standardized bias and the p -values (cf. Abadie 2002; Diamond and Sekhon 2008). A standardized bias within the interval $[-0.25; 0.25]$ indicates that a variable is well balanced (Ho, Imai *et al.* 2007: 220). The remaining differences are minimal and range between $[-0.25; 0.25]$. Moreover, all p -values are well above the value of 0.10. Table OA.6 and Table OA.7 display the results of the regression analyses based on the two datasets I produce by using the matching technique, one dataset per treatment. The regression results are overall identical to the results produced by the original dataset without matching. They corroborate the argument of the democratizing potential of transgovernmental networks and also show evidence supporting the expected facilitating effect of prior experiences through a stay abroad. Moreover, the results confirm that exposure to foreign media does not shape attitudes toward democratic governance; the coefficient on foreign media is not significant and even slightly negative in all models. In sum, if I control for a potential selection bias the results of the regression analyses remain robust.

TABLE OA.6 Regression results with matched data

	(1b)	(2b)	(3b)	(4b)	(5b)
Data matched on internat. education (N = 66)					
<i>Treatment Variables</i>					
Foreign media	-1.36 (1.15)			-1.51 (1.14)	-1.33 (1.11)
Internat. education		-0.40 (0.88)		-0.40 (0.85)	0.75 (0.92)
Transgov. Networks			2.03* (1.01)	2.07* (1.01)	2.95** (1.08)
<i>Control Variables</i>					
Directorate					-1.68 (0.94)
Postgraduate					0.72 (0.98)
Study subject					
Law/ Econ.					2.35* (1.06)
Public admin.					3.40* (1.53)
Natural Science (base category)					
Languages					
English					-1.02 (1.20)
French					NA
Women					0.22 (1.09)
Age					0.03 (0.08)
Intercept	36.64*** (1.06)	35.72*** (0.66)	33.93*** (0.89)	35.39*** (1.39)	32.54*** (4.16)
<i>Adjusted R</i> ²	0.006	-0.012	0.048	0.044	0.122
<i>AIC</i>	356.5877	357.7939	353.9583	355.9484	356.4368
Data matched on foreign media (N= 92)					
<i>Treatment Variables</i>					
Foreign media	-0.18 (0.90)			-0.61 (0.92)	-0.21 (0.90)
Internat. education		-0.27 (0.72)		-0.32 (0.72)	-0.52 (0.78)
Transgov. Networks			1.44* (0.75)	1.59* (0.78)	1.80* (0.84)
<i>Control Variables</i>					
Directorate					-1.38 (0.73)
Postgraduate					1.19 (0.76)
Study subject					
Law/ Econ.					0.98 (0.80)
Public admin.					1.82 (1.11)
Natural Science (base category)					
Languages					
English					0.33 (0.91)
French					NA
Women					0.17 (0.75)
Age					0.12* (0.06)
Intercept	35.94*** (0.81)	35.89*** (0.45)	34.78*** (0.3)	35.29*** (0.91)	29.29*** (2.67)
<i>Adjusted R</i> ²	-0.011	-0.01	0.028	0.014	0.072
<i>AIC</i>	487.929	487.8309	484.3258	487.6217	488.4098

Note: Coefficients of multiple least square regression analyses are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; missing cases deleted listwise; * $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$, *** $p \leq .000$.

TABLE OA.7 Regression results with matched data – Interaction effects

	Internat. Education (<i>N</i> = 66)			Foreign Media (<i>N</i> = 92)		
	(6b.A)	(7b.A)	(8b.A)	(6b.M)	(7b.M)	(8b.M)
<i>Treatment Variables</i>						
Foreign media	-0.71 (1.07)	-1.70 (2.22)	-2.08 (1.86)	-0.27 (0.91)	-0.51 (0.91)	-0.50 (0.91)
Internat. education	-3.61* (1.83)	0.79 (0.94)	-0.24 (2.18)	-0.33 (0.78)	1.21 (0.78)	-0.32 (1.78)
Transgov. Networks	-0.40 (1.61)	2.54 (2.39)	3.05** (1.10)	2.43* (0.94)	1.72 (1.29)	1.79 (0.84)
<i>Interaction Variables</i>						
Education x networks	5.42** (2.01)			-1.21 (0.84)		
Media x networks		0.51 (2.65)			0.10 (1.17)	
Media x education			-1.21 (0.84)			-0.22 (1.78)
<i>Control Variables</i>						
Directorate	-1.14 (0.91)	-1.67 (0.95)	-1.37 (0.72)	-1.37 (0.72)	-1.38 (0.73)	-1.39 (0.73)
Postgraduate	0.15 (0.95)	0.69 (1.00)	1.12 (0.76)	1.12 (0.76)	1.21 (0.78)	1.18 (0.78)
Study subject						
Law/ Econ.	2.07* (1.01)	2.36* (1.07)	1.17 (0.81)	1.17 (0.81)	0.10 (0.82)	0.98 (0.81)
Public admin.	2.79 (1.46)	3.40* (1.54)	1.95 (1.10)	1.94 (1.10)	1.81 (1.11)	1.80 (1.12)
Natural Science (base category)						
Languages						
English	-1.27 (1.14)	-1.04 (1.22)	0.18 (0.91)	0.18 (0.91)	0.33 (0.91)	0.33 (0.92)
French	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Women	0.26 (0.80)	0.24 (1.10)	0.08 (0.75)	0.08 (0.75)	0.17 (0.75)	0.16 (0.76)
Age	0.01 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)	0.11 (0.06)	0.11* (0.06)	0.12* (0.06)	0.12* (0.06)
Intercept	36.11*** (4.16)	32.79*** (4.39)	29.57*** (2.66)	29.57*** (2.66)	29.27*** (2.70)	29.31*** (2.69)
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.212	0.106	0.084	0.084	0.060	0.060
AIC	350.0719	358.391	358.1258	488.0369	490.4021	490.3917

Note: Coefficients of multiple least square regression analyses are unstandardized; standard errors in parentheses; missing cases deleted listwise; **p* ≤ .05, ***p* ≤ .01, *** *p* ≤ .000.

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